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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The increasing number of road tunnels is raising 
upfront an endogenous problem, which is the 
severity of accidents that may occur. Accidents in 
tunnels may lead to heavy consequences for users, 
the infrastructure itself as well as the environment. 
Especially when transportation of dangerous goods 
(DGs) is allowed through a road tunnel, the 
consequences of a possible accident take the form of 
a societal risk due to its potential extensive impact. 
Transportation of dangerous goods through road 
tunnels bears, in almost all cases, a vivid debate 
towards the sufficiency of safety procedures and the 
cost – benefit analysis for letting them pass, or not, 
through the tunnels. Although the European 
agreement concerning the international carriage of 
dangerous goods by road (ADR) defines explicitly 
the kinds of goods that can be considered dangerous, 
very often Heavy Goods Vehicles that do not carry 
dangerous goods but may lead to significant fires 
(greater than 20MW) when involved in an accident 
are also considered as dangerous, since fire is the 
most significant risk in road tunnels. 
This research explores a particular occasion 
where dangerous goods, in the broad sense, have to 
pass through cut and cover road tunnels. The 
question explored is whether dividing a long tunnel 
into more than one, shorter sections at the design 
phase would lead to higher or lower overall safety as 
the open area dividing the sections would on one 
hand relieve the impact of a DGs accident inside the 
tunnel but on the other hand would share this impact 
to the surrounding environment of the tunnel. The 
research question is of great importance, especially 
for urban tunnels (most of the times cut and cover 
technique is possible and chosen in such areas) 
where the surrounding environment of the tunnel 
consists of other roads, buildings and thus high 
concentration of population. 
The comparison among different cases has been 
implemented by using the OECD /PIARC QRA 
Model, which is probably the mostly accepted 
simulation tool for transportation of DGs through 
road tunnels. Initial findings indicate that for twin 
bore tunnels 3km long, the “cutting” of a tunnel to 
smaller sections with open areas in between the 
sections would neither increase nor decrease the 
overall safety. Thus, the decision on the preferable 
design approach should be evaluated on a case by 
case basis, as well as take into account other 
considerations for the operation of the tunnel and 
the environment. That is, a systemic approach in 
road tunnels safety is necessary. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: 
The second section presents risk analysis in road 
tunnels and highlights the importance of such an 
analysis in the conceptual design stage of a tunnel. 
The third section is divided in three subsections 
dealing with the research question, the examined 
cases description and the QRA model results. The 
paper concludes with a section which summarises 
the findings of the research and reveals the need for 
a systemic approach as far as tunnel safety is 
concerned. 
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ABSTRACT: This paper deals with risk analysis in cut and cover road tunnels. The research question 
explored is whether dividing a long tunnel into shorter sections would affect the safety when dangerous goods 
are allowed through the tunnel. In order to conclude the OECD /PIARC QRA Model quantitative risk analysis 
tool was used. Initial findings reveal that there is no evidence of increase in safety from dividing a long urban 
cut and cover tunnel in smaller parts with open air areas in between. However, the overall safety depends to a 
great extend on the specific characteristics of each particular case, since there are many factors that influence 
the overall safety of road tunnels. Therefore it is concluded that risk analysis using systemic approach is 
crucial for any road tunnel.  
2 RISK ANALYSIS IN ROAD TUNNELS 
Risk management entails the processes of risk 
identification, analysis, mitigation and follow up 
and for each process a set of potential tools exist to 
aid risk managers in their work (Leopoulos et al., 
2006). Specifically for risk analysis, simulation is 
one of the mostly used tools (Rentizelas et al., 2007; 
Tziralis et al., 2009). In its bare essence, risk 
analysis answers the fundamental questions of what 
can go wrong, how likely it is, as well as what are 
the consequences (Apostolakis, 2004) and it can be 
carried out in a qualitative or a quantitative way or 
as a combination of both. In case of a quantitative 
analysis, probabilities of accidents and their 
consequences are estimated. Quantitative risk 
analysis methods were initially developed in the 
nuclear industry in the early 1970’s (Rasmussen, 
1975). After two severe accidents with hazardous 
materials in chemical plants (Bhopal, Seveso) the 
quantitative risk analysis methods were adjusted to 
chemical plants in the late 1970’s (COVO, 1982), as 
well.  
 In the context of road tunnels, risk analysis is 
considered to be an important tool which can be 
used to improve and optimize safety. Hence the 
European Directive 2004/54/EC entitled “minimum 
safety requirements for tunnels in the trans-
European road network” requires the 
implementation of a risk analysis in cases such as 
the opening of a road tunnel to dangerous goods or 
for the evaluation of different mitigation measures 
than proposed by the Directive (PIARC, 2008). 
 Quantitative risk analysis in road tunnels 
produces a quantified risk expressed as an individual 
risk (e.g. fatality rate per tunnel kilometer) and a 
societal risk arising from the public’s aversion to 
high numbers of fatalities in a single accident 
(Khoury and Molag, 2005). A common way to 
describe societal risk is to calculate F/N curves that 
illustrate the relationship between accident 
frequency and accident severity (Knoflacher, 2002). 
A broad range of quantitative methods are available, 
thus the choice of the methods should be done by 
considering the respective advantages/disadvantages 
in the context of a specific situation (PIARC, 2008). 
Besides, the EU Directive does not indicate the 
method for performing the risk analysis or the 
criteria for risk acceptance. Therefore, each 
country’s administrative authority or even each 
tunnel manager may select the appropriate method 
of analysis as well as the criteria for risk acceptance 
(EC, 2004). However, the method that seems to be 
the most widely accepted by administrative 
authorities for quantitative risk analysis is the 
OECD /PIARC QRA Model (QRAM) that has been 
developed by INERIS, WS-Atkins and the Institute 
for Risk Research (INERIS, 2005).  
 The aim of the QRAM is to quantify the risks due 
to transport of dangerous goods on given routes of 
the road system and to evaluate the effect of the 
mitigation measures carried out in a specific road 
tunnel (Safe-T, 2008). A complete assessment of the 
risks involved in transporting dangerous goods 
would require consideration of all kinds of 
dangerous materials and other general variables 
such as meteorological conditions. As the coverage 
of all circumstances is very difficult in practice, 
simplifications are made. Thus, the QRAM 
considers 13 accident scenarios which are 
representative of the groupings of dangerous goods 
as described in the proposed regulations of PIARC 
(OECD, 2001) and have been chosen to examine 
different severe effects such as overpressure, 
thermal effect and toxity (Knoflacher et al, 2002).  
The outcome of the Model is the Individual Risk 
(expected value of risk) as well as the relevant F/N 
curves for fatalities and injuries (INERIS, 2005). 
The evaluation of the safety of a tunnel based on the 
F/N curves provided by the Model is usually made 
either on a comparative basis (comparison to 
alternative routes) or according to the positioning of 
the F/N curves compared to a threshold of non 
tolerable risk. In this work, the safety of the 
examined cases is evaluated with respect to the 
other option (comparative basis), which is to cut the 
tunnel in smaller parts. 
It must be mentioned that quantitative risk 
analysis methods such as the QRAM are very useful 
during the conceptual design stage of a tunnel 
(Molag and Trijssenaar-Buhre, 2006). During this 
stage more accurate comparison among different 
tunnel design alternatives is possible and decisions 
have to be made on aspects such as the location and 
the length of the tunnel, the tunnel type (bored, cut 
and cover, immersed), the number and dimensions 
of the tubes, the type of traffic that can be allowed 
to use the tunnel. All the aforementioned decisions, 
which are made in the early design stage of a tunnel, 
will affect the overall safety during its entire life 
cycle. Safety considerations must always be part of 
the initial stage of conceptual development since 70 
to 90 percent of the design decisions that affect 
safety will be made in these early project phases 
(Leveson, 2003). It must be clear that early 
integration of safety considerations into the tunnel 
design process allows maximum safety, therefore 
quantitative risk analysis methods should be 
implemented in this phase in order to make the right 
decisions as far as safety is concerned. It is much 
more expensive trying to mitigate the risk by adding 
protective equipment in tunnels which were unsafe 
from the beginning of their conceptual design stage.   
3 RISK ANALYSIS FOR C&C TUNNELS 
3.1 Research question 
The aim of this work is to explore whether dividing 
a long cut and cover tunnel into shorter tunnel 
sections at the design phase would lead to higher or 
lower overall safety, assuming that dangerous good 
are allowed in the tunnel. The necessary hypothesis 
in this work is that it is technically possible to make 
such a decision. It must be highlighted that the only 
criterion examined was the overall safety of the two 
alternatives. The examination of financial factors 
was out of the scope of this work. It was initially 
expected that the open area dividing the tunnel 
sections would on one hand relieve the impact of a 
DGs accident inside the tunnel but on the other hand 
would share this impact to the surrounding 
environment. Especially for urban tunnels, where 
the surrounding environment of the tunnel consists 
of other roads, buildings and thus high concentration 
of population, the research question is of great 
importance. In order to find out whether the 
‘cutting’ of a tunnel into a number of shorter 
segments in the design phase influences the overall 
tunnel safety, QRAM appeared to be a very useful 
tool. 
 Obviously neither all the road tunnels nor their 
surrounding environment are the same. For every 
single case, risk analysis is necessary when 
decisions of constructions’ characteristics are made. 
This paper focuses in answering whether the 
division of a road tunnel section into shorter ones 
has an outstanding impact on tunnel safety.  
 
3.2 Research case description 
In order to explore the research question QRAM 
was selected as the probabilistic risk analysis tool to 
facilitate decision making. The model was applied 
for a case study tunnel, to come up with tangible 
results. The overall safety of the long tunnel 
compared to the overall safety of the shorter 
segments is examined by comparing the safety of 
the two alternative designs (from now on called 
routes). The first (route L) is one 3000m twin bore 
road tunnel. The second (route S) consists of three 
shorter twin bore road tunnels each of length 900m. 
In route S there are open road sections between the 
tunnel sections, with length 150 meters, as shown in 
figure 1. 
 
      
 
Figure 1. The two alternatives routes. 
 
 The length of the open area was chosen as short as 
possible so that the two alternative routes do not 
differ significantly in the total length of tunnel 
(3000m vs 2700m in the case examined). In both 
routes the construction is twin bore cut and cover. In 
order to conclude if there is a difference in the 
overall safety of the two alternatives, the safety level 
of the two routes was compared for three different 
cases. In case 1 the average daily traffic is 
considered 10,000 vehicles per day. The 
surrounding population is assumed to be 2,000 
inhabitants per square kilometer. The examination 
of the two different approaches is hereafter named, 
case 1L for the 3km tunnel (route L) and case 1S for 
the alternative option of the three shorter road 
tunnels (route S) for the aforementioned traffic and 
surrounding population data. 
 Considering that road tunnels are dynamic 
systems, meaning that some of their components are 
changing during time, in case 2 the overall safety of 
the examined alternative routes was explored for a 
higher traffic volume, without changing any other of 
the parameters. The rationale behind this choice is 
that even if the overall safety of the two alternative 
examined routes does not differ significantly in the 
current traffic volume of 10,000 vehicles per day 
(case 1), future changes in traffic density should be 
taken into consideration, since traffic tends to be 
increased during a road tunnel’s lifetime in most 
cases. This case aims at revealing if traffic volume 
is a critical parameter affecting the research 
question. In this case, case 2L stands for the 3km 
tunnel with traffic volume of 20,000 vehicles per 
day, whereas case 2S is the alternative option of the 
three shorter road tunnels with the traffic volume of 
20,000 vehicles per day. 
 Finally, since one of the key questions was 
whether the three shorter tunnel sections would 
share the accident’s impact to the surrounding 
environment more intensively than in the case of the 
single tunnel, the overall safety of the alternative 
routes for a denser surrounding population than the 
previous cases was examined in case 3. Case 3L is 
the 3km tunnel with surrounding population of 
5,000 inhabitants per square kilometer and traffic 
volume of 10,000 vehicles per day, whereas case 3S 
is the alternative option of the three shorter road 
tunnels with the aforementioned traffic and 
surrounding population data.  
 It must be mentioned that the total traffic for all 
three cases is the traffic volume of both directions, 
as all the examined tunnels are twin bore. In a 
nutshell, the necessary data for using the QRA 
model for the three cases is presented in table 1.  
 
Table 1. Cases’ description 
Case 
Traffic volume 
(vehicles/day) 
Surrounding 
population 
(people/square km) 
1 10,000 2,000 
2 20,000 2,000 
3 10,000 5,000 
 
 In order to apply the QRAM some additional data 
were necessary. These data were considered to be 
the same for all the cases examined. As far as traffic 
data are concerned, the average speed is assumed to 
be 80km/h for the light vehicles and 60km/h for 
heavy good vehicles (HGVs) which is a typical 
average speed in urban tunnels. Other traffic related 
data that have been used are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Traffic data 
Traffic-related data   
HGV traffic (% of total traffic) 15 
Bus traffic (% of total traffic) 1.5 
Average number of persons in a car 1.85 
Average number of persons in a HGV 1.17 
Average number of persons in a bus 40 
 
 Another critical factor was the safety equipment of 
the tunnels. The tunnel in route L (cases 1L, 2L, 3L) 
must have exactly the same kind of equipment with 
the shorter tunnels in route S (cases 1S, 2S, 3S). 
Otherwise any difference in the overall safety of the 
two alternatives routes would stem from the 
different safety measures of the tunnels and not 
from the different construction option. The main 
characteristics of the tunnels are presented in table 
3. It must be mentioned that in route S all the three 
tunnels have identical characteristics. 
 
Table 3. Road tunnels characteristics 
    Alternative routes 
   route L route S 
Construction 
data 
Type cut&cover cut&cover 
Length(m) 3000 3 x 900 
Lanes (per 
direction) 
2 2 
Gradient 0% 0% 
Camber 2.5% 2.5% 
Width(m) 9.32 9.32 
Open cross-
sectional area(m
2
) 
64.3 64.3 
Structual 
measures 
Emergency exits 
every 
500m 
every 
500m 
Drainage open 
area (m
2
) 
0.009 0.009 
Dranage interval 
(m) 
25 25 
Ventilation 
(longitudinal) 
Normal operation 
(m
3
/s) 
only piston 
effect 
only piston 
effect 
Emergency 
Operation (m
3
/s) 
196 196 
Mitigation 
measures   
Siren/bell Siren/bell 
3.3 Research results 
The following charts show the results of the QRAM 
for the three examined cases. In each chart the F/N 
curve of route L is compared to the F/N curve of 
route S for all the cases examined. 
 For case 1, case 1L results in an expected value 
(fatalities + injuries per year) of 3.554E
-1
, whereas 
for case 1S the respective value is 3.282 E
-1
. By this 
yardstick the level of safety in case 1L is slightly 
lower than in case 1S. As shown in Figure 2, the 
F/N curve of case 1L is slightly higher (lower 
safety) than the F/N curve of case 1S. 
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Table 4 presents the difference in the expected 
value for all the QRAM scenarios for DGs. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. QRAM results for case 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For case 2 and specifically for case 2L the expected 
value (fatalities + injuries per year) is 8.340E
-1
 
whereas for case 2S it is 7.693E
-1
. By this yardstick 
the level of safety in case 2L is slightly lower than 
that of case 2S. As presented in Figure 3, the F/N 
curve of case 2L is slightly higher (lower safety) 
than the F/N curve of case 2S. 
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Table 5 presents the difference in the expected value 
for all the QRAM scenarios for DGs. 
 
Table 5. QRAM results for case 2 
QRAM scenarios Case 2L Case 2S 
All scenarios 8.340E
-1
 7.693E
-1
 
20-100MW 3.359E
-1
 3.094E
-1
 
Flammable liquids 4.275E
-2
 3.833E
-2
 
Toxic products 4.501E
-1
 4.179E
-1
 
Propane in bulk 5.269E
-3
 3.636E
-3
 
 
Finally, for case 3 and for case 3L the expected 
value (fatalities + injuries per year) is 6.646E
-1
 
whereas for case 3S it is 6.109E
-1
. By this criterion 
the level of safety in case 3L is slightly lower than 
that of case 3S since, as shown in Figure 4, the F/N 
curve of case 3L is slightly higher (lower safety) 
than the F/N curve of  case 3S. 
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 Table 6 presents the difference in the expected 
value for all the QRAM scenarios. 
 
Table 6. QRAM results for case 3. 
QRAM scenarios Case 3L Case 3S 
All scenarios 6.646 E
-1
 6.109 E
-1
 
20-100MW 1.181 E
-1
 1.099 E
-1
 
Flammable liquids 1.143 E
-2
 1.012 E
-2
 
Toxic products 5.336 E
-1
 4.978 E
-1
 
Propane in bulk 1.460 E
-3
 1.187 E
-3
 
 
  The increase in the traffic volume that 
differentiates case 2 from case 1 or the denser 
surrounding population of case 3 compared to case 1 
naturally increase the expected value of fatalities 
and injuries. However, in all the aforementioned 
cases, the safety of route L is slightly lower than in 
route S. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this work was to explore a particular 
case where dangerous goods have to pass through 
typical cut and cover road tunnels. The question 
explored was whether dividing a long tunnel into 
three shorter sections at the conceptual design stage 
would affect the overall safety. Early decisions in 
the geometrical characteristics of a tunnel would 
affect its overall safety during its whole life cycle 
and therefore the research question is of outmost 
importance in the early stages of such a construction 
project. In order to conclude, quantitative risk 
analysis tools and specifically the OECD /PIARC 
QRA Model was used to perform the risk analysis of 
the cases examined. The overall safety of the first 
alternative (one long tunnel - route L) was compared 
to the other alternative of its division into three 
shorter tunnels (route S) for three different cases.  
 According to the calculations of the model, 
‘cutting’ the tunnel into three shorter sections leads 
always to a safer state. However, the difference in 
the Expected Value of the risk as well as the 
comparison of the F/N curves for all the cases 
QRAM scenarios Case 1L Case 1S 
All scenarios 3.554E
-1
 3.282E
-1
 
20-100MW 1.181E
-1
 1.099E
-1
 
Flammable 
liquids 1.143E
-2
 1.010E
-2
 
Toxic products 2.245E
-1
 2.071E
-1
 
Propane in bulk 1.373E
-3
 1.079E
-3
 
examined is not big enough to indicate a doubtless 
superiority of the shorter sections (route S) against 
one long tunnel (route L). According to PIARC 
(2008) when the ratio of the EV of two alternative 
routes is less than 3 (which is valid for all the cases 
examined here) then other criteria are required to 
make a decision on which one is safer. 
 Thus, other factors such as the psychological 
condition of road tunnel users in the two possible 
alternatives should be taken into account. One could 
claim that the alternative of the shorter tunnels 
(route S) would reduce the sense of claustrophobia 
among tunnel users and, since tunnel users’ 
behavior is a critical factor in road tunnels safety, 
route S would be a safer option than route L. On the 
other hand, route L could be considered much safer 
than route S in cases of unfavourable meteorological 
conditions. For example, consecutive small tunnels 
are less safe in case of frost, heavy rain or glaring 
from sunlight.    
 As a conclusion, the answer to the research 
question as far as the transportation of dangerous 
goods is concerned is that there is no evidence of 
increase in safety from dividing a long urban cut and 
cover tunnel in smaller parts with open air areas in 
between. However, the overall safety (that should 
take into account all risks and not only those that are 
due to the transportation of dangerous goods) 
depends to a great extend on the specific 
characteristics of each particular case, since there 
are many factors that influence the overall safety of 
road tunnels. These factors are not taken into 
consideration by any quantitative risk analysis 
model, and also by the QRAM. The QRAM only 
considers increased probabilities of accidents near 
tunnel portals, a factor that influences risk in route S 
of the cases examined but does not consider many 
other critical factors. Therefore it is concluded that 
risk analysis using systemic approach is crucial for 
any road tunnel as early as in the design phase and 
lasting for its whole lifecycle. Moreover, 
quantitative risk analysis models such as the QRAM 
should not be the sole basis for decision making by 
tunnel operators or Administrative Authorities. As 
Apostolakis (2004) states safety-related decision 
making is risk-informed, not risk-based. Thus, as far 
as road tunnel safety is concerned, a systemic 
approach combining quantitative risk analysis tools 
with traditional safety analysis and systems theory 
principles should be implemented. 
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